Daniel Detzer and Hansjoerg Herr deliver a superb summary of timeless economic theories of financial crisis. The main focus is on (i) escalatory inflation and deflation dynamics caused by monetary policy, (ii) boom and bust investment cycles caused by herding and inefficient expectation formation, and (iii) speculative bubbles related to cognitive behaviour that is inconsistent with efficient markets.
The vulnerability of modern dealer bank financing
Modern dealer bank financing relies largely on collateralized transactions. In order to achieve collateral efficiency institutions engage in rehypothecation, for example through matched-book transactions, internalizing trading activities, and re-pledging of margin collateral. A New York Fed article suggests that this funding structure faces risks from rollover, credit rating downgrades, and reputational considerations.
How banks have adjusted to higher capital requirements
Capital regulation reform requires banks to hold a much higher ratio of core capital to risk-weighted assets, taking some toll on lending and economic activity. An empirical analysis by the BIS suggests that the process is well under way. Mathematically, most of the adjustment has been achieved through retained earnings. However, in developed countries also lending spreads have increased, credit growth growth has slowed, trading assets have declined, and the share of higher risk-weighted assets has fallen.
Financialization of commodity markets: the basics
An academic summary paper shows how the structure of commodity markets has changed, most notably through the growth of commodity index investors. This has raised the correlation of commodities with other asset classes. Moreover, this financialization may impair at times the two key functions of commodity markets: risk sharing and price discovery.
How real money funds could destabilize bond markets
A paper by Feroli, Kashyap, Schoneholtz and Shin illustrates how unlevered funds can become a source of asset price momentum due to peer pressure and redemptions. Regulatory reforms that impair bank intermediation could compound negative escalatory dynamics. This raises the risk of dislocations in fixed income markets if and when extraordinary monetary accommodation is being withdrawn.
The ECB and the option of large-scale asset purchases
Large-scale asset purchases have become a plausible policy option for the European Central Bank. A BNP research report suggests that an initial meaningful program could require purchases worth 3-5% of euro area GDP. A program of that size would have to focus on the sovereign bond market, with the acquisition of private-sector assets possibly featuring as a complement.
Tracking the history of sovereign defaults
Bank of Canada has assembled a new broad database on global public debt default. It shows that after sovereign delinquency had exceeded 5% of outstanding debt in the 1980s, it declined alongside falling interest rates to below 1% in the 2000s and has remained low despite the global financial and euro sovereign crises. In a longer (200 year) context sovereign default ratios have moved in long cycles, each stretching over several decades.
Time-varying macroprudential policy
Persistent highly accommodative monetary policy in the U.S. raises fears of building systemic vulnerabilities. Federal Reserve board member Tarullo has discussed the use of time-varying macroprudential policy as a means to contain these risks and to allow monetary policy to keep rates low for longer. This policy has many limitations, however.
Europe’s bank-sovereign nexus (revisited)
A Bank of Italy paper illustrates and explains the rise in European banks’ sovereign debt holding since the great financial crisis. It also reiterates structural causes for bank-sovereign feedback loops. One would conclude that this nexus remains an important factor for market dynamics and monetary policy.
The impact of high public debt on economic growth
Academic work suggests that public debt above 90% of GDP is a drag for GDP growth. This would apply to the developed world today. However, a new IMF paper based on a broad panel of countries going back to 1875 qualifies this rule. It suggests that high debt does not per se reduce growth. Only if debt levels are both elevated and rising, growth tends to suffer. On its own high debt does often entail greater output volatility, however.
